The Leonard Lopate Show August 9, 2011 Click here to listen
America Not Alone with Debt Problems
After weeks of partisan sniping that made one weepy for smoke-filled rooms, Congress ended the debt ceiling debate by kicking the can of fiscal discipline down the red-ink brick road. Lucky for us the rest of the world is as dysfunctional as Washington. Read the entire post on the US News & World Report website.
Author interview: Fox5, Washington D.C.
Fox5 2011/8/4 Click here to listen
How we became a nation of warriors
Salon.com 2011-08-01 (This article is a condensed excerpt from Stephen Glain's new book, "State vs. Defense: The Battle to Define America's Empire," available August 2 from Crown.)
News travels fast across the red desert bush of remote Djibouti. Even as U.S. military reservists hurry to erect a small field hospital around a cluster of tents and vacant block houses near a desolate watering hole, dozens of tribespeople are waiting for treatment in orderly rows. They arrive with maladies of every sort -- bad teeth, diarrhea, fevers, colds, arthritis. At the triage center, a middle-aged tribesman has had a thorn removed from the instep of his foot, a wound that had been infected for months. At the dental surgery station, Navy lieutenant Bill Anderson, an orthodontist from Northfield, New Jersey, will over the next few hours extract a dozen rotting or impacted teeth using instruments that sparkle in the late-morning sun. His patients endure their operations without so much as a wince or low groan, and he gives each one an antibiotic rinse to prevent infection.
It is 2008, and this Medical Civil Action Program, as it is known, is provided courtesy of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, an 1,800-man deployment of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines. The base was established in Djibouti, an enclave of calm in an unstable area, immediately after the September 11 attacks. Al Qaeda units, it was feared, would take advantage of the chaos in neighboring Somalia and nest there. When no terrorists turned up, the task force was assigned to perform humanitarian initiatives with the guidance of the United States Agency for International Development, the State Department's foreign assistance arm.
Embedded in the operation is a lone USAID official. Her minority status is symptomatic of a new age in U.S. foreign policy, one in which America, in peacetime as well as in war, is represented abroad more by warriors than by civilians.
Quietly, gradually -- and inevitably, given the weight of its colossal budget and imperial writ -- the Pentagon has all but eclipsed the State Department at the center of U.S. foreign policy. The process began just over a century ago, gathered pace with World War II, and hit its stride during the Cold War with a global empire that not only survived the collapse of the Soviet Union but was greatly enhanced by it. Even before terrorists struck the nation on September 11, America was spring-loaded for conflict on many fronts. A decade later, U.S. troops are engaged in the country's longest war in addition to counterinsurgency and developmental assistance work throughout the world. At the same time, the capability of the nation's diplomatic and foreign aid agencies has dramatically diminished. While four-star generals wield enormous influence among U.S. allies, ambassadors and senior USAID officials are regarded more and more as functionaries and contractors. They are saddled with chronic staff shortages, eroded language skills, and low morale. In an era of endless war, a growing share of diplomats and aid workers are assigned to missions in areas so hazardous they require armed escorts when traveling. And unlike their uniformed counterparts, they lack replacement staff for regular rotations. In the increasingly tight competition for humanitarian and development funds, they are losing out to the Pentagon, now the federal government's fastest-growing source of foreign aid.
Even Robert Gates, the former CIA director and the defense secretary to both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, has lamented the militarization of America's presence overseas. He has called for a significant boost in the State Department-USAID budgets, so that diplomats and development experts can bring more to the evolving partnership between civilian agencies and the military in the battle for hearts and minds. This implies, of course, that military might is key to the resolution of America's global challenges, when in fact it creates more problems than it solves. Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, political leaders in Washington and their proconsuls abroad continue to behave as if U.S. hegemony is not only inevitable and necessary but sustainable and desired. It is a costly misperception that led, at least in part, to the September 11 attacks and America's ruinous involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the geopolitical map shifting from a U.S.-centric world back to a Victorian era cluster of competing regional powers, the myth of American exceptionalism has been dispelled nearly everywhere but in Washington.
American militarism is unique for its civilian provenance. It did not follow a barracks coup or a popular call for a man on horseback to impose order on an unraveling republic. No martial law was declared and there is no military cabal pulling the strings of a nominal civilian authority. In fact, it is largely civilians who have played the dominant role in weaponizing foreign policy abroad and security policy at home.
However diverse in temperament and background, American militarists throughout the last century share common values and proclivities: In the algorithms of global affairs they see a simple contest between good and evil, and in engagement they see a graveyard filled with grand, game changing initiatives. Their reality is selective, a buffet rather than a set course meal, from which convenient facts may be selected and neatly presented. Their impulse is not to reason but to alarm, and they freely concoct dangers when real ones are unavailable. For much of the Cold War, they believed in a communist monolith that never existed. Until the day the Berlin Wall fell, they promoted Pentagon exaggerations of Soviet power abroad while overlooking its crippling weaknesses at home.
Today, they counsel an armed onslaught against an Islamist movement that cannot be subdued by force, and they agitate for a militarized response to a resurgent China, which, if pursued as effectively as their other star-crossed enterprises, will make a war between the United States and the world's most populous nation all but inevitable. They have disparaged not only the agents of diplomacy but diplomacy itself, impoverishing the State Department and USAID and compelling the military to fill a growing share of what were once the roles and responsibilities of civilians. The Pentagon, wisely identifying such missions as a growth industry in the absence of a clear and present military threat, is very much along for the ride. A half century after Dwight Eisenhower's historic warning about an aggrandizing "military-industrial complex," American militarization is an established and probably immutable fact. It is a manifestation of the founders' deepest fears and the worst betrayal of the nation's republican ideals.
The lawyers, farmers, and merchants who shaped late-eighteenth-century America were preoccupied not with military adventures but with commerce. They had seen how permanent military bureaucracies in Europe had routinely eroded civilian authority and they emphatically rejected a standing army for their infant republic. In 1796 the outgoing President George Washington spoke for a nation of citizen-soldiers when he said that unity and neutrality would safeguard American interests far more efficiently than "overgrown military establishments which ... are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty."
If the founders were suspicious of standing armies led by Prussian style general staffs, they held the European tradition of diplomacy in similarly low esteem -- to the point of ambivalence about whether the United States should have a diplomatic corps. Serving President Washington as America's first secretary of state, Thomas Jefferson led a department with three clerks, two ambassadors, and ten counselors posted abroad. Even then, lawmakers considered high diplomacy a luxury and would deny the nation's envoys the resources enjoyed by their counterparts across the Atlantic. There would be no European-style academies for the study of languages, culture, history, and protocol. Jefferson's bud get, at $56,000, was so tight he was forced to sell a horse and some of his furniture to keep America's overseas missions adequately funded.
For much of the nineteenth century, it was diplomats, more often than not men in morning suits and top hats, who represented the United States as it extended its sovereign frontier westward and beyond. William Henry Seward, secretary of state to presidents Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson, famously negotiated the purchase of Alaska from Russia for the equivalent today of $95 million. John Hay, statesman, author, journalist, and one of the most agile and renowned American minds of his era, began his career in government at the age of twenty-two as Lincoln's assistant private secretary. In 1898, as President William McKinley's secretary of state, he negotiated the Treaty of Paris that ended the Spanish-American War on terms favorable to Washington. In the early 1900s, he was an influential promoter of the Open Door Policy toward China, which gave Washington pole position in the extraterritorial rush among Western powers and Japan to colonize the coastal rim of China. Hay also shepherded the transfer of U.S. authority over what would become the Panama Canal from its French concessionaire.
Throughout his prolific career, Hay presided over some fifty bilateral and multilateral treaties. It was the high renaissance of American diplomacy and it succeeded too well. On behalf of a republic, Hay had negotiated the foundations of empire. It now required a military to build one.
Like so many of its recent wars, imperial America was itself a needless extravagance. The country is not an island nation like Britain or Japan, critically dependent on outside sources for raw materials and energy supplies. Nor was it forced to punch above its weight like tiny Belgium or Holland, wedged between rival and often hostile powers. The United States enjoyed a huge domestic market, was rich in natural resources, and was safely distant from potential aggressors. Instead of managing costly armies and imperial projects that had defined and debilitated Europe, America had wisely invested in the sinew and gray matter of a modern, self-reliant, and prosperous state: education, a transparent judicial system, railroads, seaports, agriculture, and industry.
The more America prospered, however, the greater its hunger for expansionism became. By the end of the nineteenth century, militarists in Washington and the media were angling for war with Spain and, sotto voce, its stable of dependencies. Bourgeois evangelicals who were already building churches and universities in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East knew that a colonial system meant whole new tributaries of redeemable souls for the netting. American industry, most prominently tropical food processors such as United Fruit Company and the Hawaiian Pineapple Company (later known as the Dole Food Company), together with their financiers, similarly craved new markets and suppliers.
Opponents, meanwhile, argued that empire was antithetical to American ideals. In 1898 former president Grover Cleveland warned that expansionism was a "perversion of our national mission ... to build up and make a greater country out of what we have instead of annexing islands." A year later, the sociologist William Graham Sumner warned that Americans "cannot govern dependencies with our political system, and ... if we try it, the state which our fathers founded will suffer a reaction that will transform it into another empire just after the fashion of the old ones. That is what imperialism means."
To this, hegemonists had a ready answer: the nation's colonial mission was a righteous enterprise, divinely inspired. Accepting his Republican Party's nomination for governor of New York in October 1898, Theodore Roosevelt delivered a soaring, chauvinist oration. Admonishing a packed crowd at Carnegie Hall against "a life of fossilized isolation," and with U.S. troops mopping up resistance in Cuba and the Philippines, Roosevelt played the White Messiah card. The American flag, he said, "stands for liberty and civilization. Where it has once floated, there must and shall be no return to tyranny or savagery." It is no wonder that, while Franklin D. Roosevelt is the darling of the American left, militarists on the right are besotted with his excitable uncle.
Americans would have their empire, an enterprise rooted in the belief system of American exceptionalism that dates back to the seventeenth century, when religious exiles fancied the colonies a new Jerusalem ordained to Christianize a pagan land. Like the ideological impulse that drove it, American empire would differ from its European counterparts. There would be no colonial office, for example, no large administrative bureaucracies in villas and bungalows led by citizens from the mother stem and staffed by the foreign unfortunates. American empire would come in a carapace of large-scale military deployments and bases to accommodate them, together with pre-positioned arms depots and commissaries stocked with material goods from home. In concert with allied armies, key constituents in U.S. foreign relations, it would flex its expeditionary muscle through joint exercises with such code names as Cobra Gold and Team Spirit.
Geography, which made American empire unnecessary in the first place, now perversely accounts for its resilience. The United States, corseted as it is by two vast oceans, is the only country rich enough to afford the modern warships needed to patrol them. Most Americans, meanwhile, wrongly credit the warships, rather than the oceans, as the reason they can take security for granted. When the United States makes war, it does so in obscure, distant lands, and a vast majority of Americans are happily estranged from the conflicts waged in their name. For the 99.5 percent of the population that constitutes the civilian demographic, war is something experienced as a video game or an HBO miniseries, if at all.
Decades ago, when military service in America was compulsory, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Fred C. Weyand wrote that "the American Army really is a people's Army in the sense that it belongs to the American people, who take a jealous and propriety interest in its involvement ... The Army, therefore, cannot be committed lightly." Weyand's remarks are as dated as conscription. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Washington has waged war eight more times than it did during its sixty-year confrontation with Moscow. Precisely because the U.S. military is professional and largely segregated from civilian society, it is deployed not only lightly but promiscuously, often out of domestic political imperatives rather than national security interests and in ways that evade public knowledge altogether.
As of 2007, the Pentagon acknowledged the concentration of 190,000 troops and 115,000 civilian employees inside 909 military facilities in forty-six countries and territories. They included, for example, Balad Air Base in Iraq, which covers sixteen square miles, with an additional twelve square-mile "security perimeter" large enough to be seen from outer space. In August 2010, President Barack Obama declared that America's major combat mission in Iraq was over. Balad Air Base, however, like Pentagon installations that have been around since the early years of the Cold War, is going nowhere.
The price of America's military base network overseas, along with the expense of its national security state at home, is enormous. There is the Defense Department's budget of more than $700 billion, of course, but beyond that is a host of related outlays that get little attention. There is the Department of Energy's $20 billion expense for nuclear weapons research and storage. The country's intelligence community, a subculture of sixteen agencies that engage in everything from satellite reconnaissance to cloak-and-dagger espionage, is funded from a "black" bud get estimated conservatively at about $75 billion. The Department of Veterans Affairs is the federal government's third-richest agency, with a funding mandate of over $120 billion, while the Department of Homeland Security draws nearly $45 billion. The Department of the Treasury spends another $25 billion or so underwriting veterans' retirement plans. Add to all this the interest owed on the money Washington borrows to pay for national security -- America is a net debtor, after all -- and the bill comes in at well over $1 trillion. That is equal to nearly 8 percent of gross domestic product and more than 20 percent of the federal budget. (By comparison, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, the four countries Pentagon planners routinely trot out as conventional threats to the general welfare, have cumulative defense expenditures of less than $200 billion.) These are only the known costs of hegemony. In July 2010, the Washington Post published a three-part exposé of a post–September 11 "top-secret world," a counterinsurgency network that had become "so large, so unwieldy and so secretive that no one knows how much money it costs, how many people it employs, how many programs exist within it or exactly how many agencies do the same work."
In February 2011, facing trillion-dollar budget deficits for the next decade, President Barack Obama called for a five-year freeze on all domestic discretionary spending. But he exempted Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security, the entitlement programs that consume nearly two thirds of the federal budget, as well as funding for the Pentagon, the Veterans Administration, and homeland security, which accounts for nearly everything else. In late 2010, a presidential debt-reduction commission called for a 15 percent cut in the Pentagon's procurement budget, a three year freeze in noncombatant military pay, and a reduction in its overseas deployments by a third. This met with howls of opposition, from the halls of Congress to the respected Small Wars Journal, an electronic journal focused on the culture and mechanics of counterinsurgency. Deep cuts in weapons procurement and research, argued its managing editor in a November 11 post, amounted to an unacceptable concession to "emerging peer competitors like China" while posing "higher risks to [U.S.] alliances in East Asia and around the Persian Gulf." The federal bud get, it seems, has become a $3.8 trillion perpetual trust -- rolled over annually by America's foreign creditors -- for the armed services and their contractors, the elderly, and the infirm.
Lawmakers from both sides of the legislative aisle are talking seriously about cutting defense outlays, a measure of how advanced is the nation's fiscal decay. Unveiling the Defense Department's 2012 budget, Secretary Gates placed several costly weapons programs on the chopping block and called for a "culture of savings" to replace the Pentagon's "culture of spending." Inevitably, that will put him on a collision course with politicians who cling to armaments projects for the employment opportunities they offer constituents back home. For them, the dividing line between national security and job security is all but invisible, and as a result even obsolete weapons have survived sustained attempts by Gates and his predecessors to have them killed. Moreover, long after the current budget debate is resolved, the State Department will still be struggling to make do with a fraction of the resources enjoyed by the Pentagon. Until that imbalance is reconciled, the militarization of U.S. foreign policy will only proliferate.
It is unusual, perhaps unprecedented, for a government to wage simultaneous wars while sparing all but a fraction of its citizens from their human costs. This creates its own kind of vulnerability. As the soldier-historian John McAuley Palmer noted between the world wars, professional armies subvert democracy because they "relieve the people themselves of the duty of self-defense ... An enduring government by the people must include an army of the people among its vital institutions." Elaborating on this, Boston University professor and Vietnam veteran Andrew Bacevich has written that "the ideal relationship between the armed forces and democratic society is a symbiotic one, in which each draws nourishment from the other. Symbiosis implies intimacy ... What ever its other merits, the present-day professionalized force is not conducive to civil-military intimacy."
State vs. Defense, the century-old competition between those who would confront America's overseas challenges through diplomatic means and those who would subdue them by force of arms, is all but decided. The economic and political resources commanded by the latter group are vast and powerful, while the former has been reduced to a cadre of supplicants forced to beg before the lavish table of the national security state. Such a lopsided state of affairs has been abetted by a citizenry generally uninterested in the policies carried out in its name and unwilling to share in the burden of their prosecution. Only now, with the specter of bankruptcy looming over the national accounts, are some in Washington daring to contest the bill for, if not the value of, unchecked global hegemony.
Source URL: http://www.salon.com/books/history/index.html?story=/news/feature/2011/07/31/state_vs_defense_stephen_glain_excerpt
Showdown at the Oasis
OnEarth (Web exclusive) 2011-07-28 A mega-resort west of Cairo threatens a vast archeological treasure.
Each working day, a road crew lays another few hundred feet of two-lane highway around Lake Qarun, the gemstone of the Fayoum governorate in central Egypt. When finished, the 60-kilometer tarmac will serve a planned resort complex to be raised on the northeastern shore of the lake, a stunning oasis about an hour’s drive west of Cairo, and for those opposing the project it may as well be a noose.
"The access road is the beginning of the end," says Erik R. Seiffert, a vertebrae paleontologist and an associate professor at New York’s Stony Brook University who has done research in the area. "I don’t see how we can offer any real protection with that thing coming in."
It is a tragedy of modern Egypt that what lies below the soil is often of greater potential value than what lives above it. That is certainly the case with Fayoum, which is among the more neglected regions in an historically deprived nation. Settled in 4,000 B.C., the city is thought to be one of the oldest in Egypt and is a treasure trove of antiquities of all kinds. There is little industry to speak of, to say nothing of basic services like running water and electricity beyond the urban core, and unemployment among its population of more than 300,000 is chronic. Verdant fields nourished by the Nile Delta are interrupted by gray clusters of concrete blockhouses in various stages of construction and disrepair. Buried beneath its desert sea, however, is a lavish feast of fossilized animal bones and vegetation that thrived tens of millions of years ago. Its contribution to the record of Egyptian pre-history, if properly exploited, is beyond estimation.
Egypt, however, like other countries with a long and lush patrimony, often appears to be in contempt of it. (The Egyptian Museum is notorious for the cavalier way in which it displays and curates everything from mummies to ancient cotton spores.) In 2009, Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif declared Fayoum would be transformed into a top tourist destination. Not long after that, it was announced that the cornerstone for its restoration would not be a sustainable eco-lodge and museum but Porto Fayoum, a sprawling hotel and spa complex on 650 acres along Lake Qarun, for decades a national protectorate. Upon completion, it will have the means to accommodate 5,000 guests. Its introduction to such a fragile, if vital preserve, says Seiffert, "would be the paleontological equivalent of bulldozing [the pharaonic tombs at] Luxor."
Work on Porto Fayoum is scheduled to begin late this year. The project was approved by Egypt’s Tourism Development Authority, which, like several other government agencies, is under investigation for deals it approved during the thirty-year, single-party reign of president Hosni Mubarak, who was ousted earlier this year in a peaceful uprising. It is the inspiration of the Cairo-based Amer Group, which acquired the site from the Egyptian government in 2010 for the equivalent of $28,000, or about $0.01 per square meter, according to the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt. (The Amer Group did not respond to emailed questions and requests for comment for this story.) Opposition to Porto Fayoum has been registered by Egypt’s Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs as well as Minister of Antiquities Zahi Hawass, who last year requested that the development be redesigned as a sustainable destination for eco-tourists and that it be located 1.5 kilometers away from Lake Qarun’s shoreline so as not to disturb the archeological remains that rest along its banks.
A coalition of environmental groups, led by a local NGO called Nature Conservation Egypt, are calling for the Porto Fayoum site and its surrounding areas to be declared an UNESCO Geopark, as a first step toward making it a World Heritage preserve. Stony Brook’s Seiffert is encouraging colleagues at the Egyptian Museum to assume authority over the region for the sake of its fossil finds. As Egypt prepares for national elections in September, however, and with the country’s political terrain still convulsing in the wake of Mubarak’s departure -- just last week, the government announced Hawass would be dismissed only to reverse itself a few days later -- the country’s vast bureaucracy is stuck in neutral.
"The government said it would excavate and clear the area of fossils before construction begins, but it has done nothing," says Rebecca Porteous of Nature Conservation Egypt. "We’re stymied."
In the middle of this tempest is geologist Ahmed Gedelli, one of three park rangers who is responsible for maintaining the ten-kilometer stretch of coastline that will host Porto Fayoum. Gedelli is an expert on the kind of fossil remains that make Fayoum an indispensable paleontological reserve, in particular its bounty of whale skeletons that date back some 40 million years, when the region was a bay on Egypt’s prehistoric Mediterranean coast.
From the passenger seat of a late-model Toyota Land Cruiser, below a desert escarpment capped by a sandstone ridge, Gedelli escorts a visitor from one Paleogenic find to another. Here is an exquisitely preserved specimen of Basilisaurus, a whale that grew to an average of 18 meters in length. There are the stone-like remains of a Dorudon Atrox, or "Spear Tooth," Basilisaurus’ smaller cousin. Not far away is a rare Pakicetidae, which evolved from the Early Eocene as a carnivorous mammal into a fully aquatic ancestor to modern whales.
The Pakicetidae is an extraordinary find, says Gedelli. Unlike many of the other sites, which have been partially uncovered by a millennia of Fayoum’s famously strong winds, this one is almost entirely submerged in the desert sand and is therefore most surely intact. All that betrays it is the ridge-line of its thoracic vertebrae, from which Gedelli extrapolates a giant some 35 meters long. Fully excavated, it could speak volumes about how whales made their epochal transition from land to sea.
Some months ago, Gedelli says, he sent a formal recommendation to his superiors in Cairo that the Pakicetidae be exhumed and turned into an open-air museum. "It would be a good way to protect it from tourists and fossil collectors," he says. "But I never heard back."
The Pakicetidae remains are a few kilometers up a gentle rise from where Porto Fayoum is to be erected. Just offshore is an island that accommodates a population of some 20,000 migratory White Gulls. Gedelli shrugs fatefully when asked about the impact a massive coastal development a few hundred meters away would have on the birds and their nests, or the threat posed by several thousand tourists to the delicate fossil sites that have become his life’s work.
"They will be a disruption," Gedelli finally says as his Land Cruiser abandons the desert mantel for the freshly laid tarmac of the access road. "So many tourists. I don’t know what we’ll do."
Listening to Fado where it's Sung
Web exclusive 2011-07-26 As the fat lady sings for the Euro zone, the Portuguese are doing what they've done for more than a century when things turn south: seeking refuge in the melancholic strains of fado, Iberia's signature species of torch music.
It’s midnight at Clube de Fado, a hothouse for Lisbon’s inimitable musical form, and the original crowd of a couple hundred or so has receded to a few dozen hardcore enthusiasts. Guitarist and fado great Mario Pacheco is about to open the final set of a two-hour performance, and he begins by introducing a red-haired songstress in a black dress with lace at the shoulders and her hair tied back in a bun. She is Dutch, a native of Holland, though she has adopted fado and all its Iberian angst. Maria Fernandez, as she is introduced, is clearly nervous – this is her debut performance at the club – though the audience is sympathetic and eager to be wooed.
Pacheco, tall and distinguished with a patrician brow and tightly clipped moustache, deploys some light banter to keep Fernandez’s stage freight at bay before they ease into the first number, a spirited ballad in three-quarter time. As the piece builds, he and his two bandmates – one on rhythm guitar, the other on bass fiddle – exchange wry glances as if sharing a private joke. Her inhibition vanquished, Fernandez warms to the beat and deftly nails the high notes. When the set ends twenty minutes later, she owns the room.
Romance and redemption is a staple offering in the fado bars of Lisbon, and no one serves it better than Pacheco, the 57-year-old fadista who is widely acknowledged as a master of the genre. He first picked up a guitar at 14, a relative latecomer, and within a few years was good enough to accompany his father, himself a classically trained musician. At 17 he attended a local conservatory, where he studied the guitar and the violin, and by his early thirties he was writing his own compositions. At 36, as one of Lisbon’s top classical guitarists, he switched to the Portuguese guitarra, a flat-backed, oval instrument that looks more like a mandolin than its conventional, hour-glass shaped counterpart. He’s been playing fado ever since.
“My father and my friends said they were losing a great classical guitarist and gaining a bad Portuguese guitarist,” Pacheco says with a grin. “That was my best motivation to learn fado.”
Often compared to the blues, fado – literally “fate” – identifies with the Portuguese concept of saudade, a yearning for what has been lost and what has never been attained. It evolved more than a century ago from the Alfama casbah and, like the blues, has remained true to is roots. “The tradition of fado runs deep,” Pacheco says between sets. “It is a timeless form of expression and its importance is increasing.”
Indeed, as Portugal packages itself into a high-end tourist draw, fado is evolving into a national brand. Young musicians throughout Europe are coming to Lisbon to learn the art, says Pacheco, and business at fado clubs has never been better. As if to reinforce the point, club impresario Louis Vaz de Camos, who keeps his eye on the crowd through a peephole in the wall that separates the bar from the stage, arrives to hustle Pacheco to start the next set.
Will success spoil fado? Unlikely, says Pacheco. Fans of the music are too devoted, too romantic, to over-commercialize such a national treasure. “Fado is not for the masses,” he says. “No matter how many people are in a room listening, they’re always seated. That’s how much respect they have for the music.”
Petraeus, Pentagon Repeating the Mistakes of Vietnam
As was widely covered by his adoring press, Gen. David Petraeus this week stepped down as commander of allied forces in Afghanistan to begin his new job as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Petraeus is the latest in a long line of celebrity soldiers that dates back to Gen. George McClellan, Abraham Lincoln’s mercurial field marshal whose star collapsed under the burden of his presidential ambitions. Read the entire post on the US News & World Report website.
Egyptian activists speak out
In June I had the pleasure of moderating a panel of young Egyptian activists who spoke about the revolution that ousted dictator Hosni Mubarak and its impact on Egypt's politics, economics and identity. The discussion was taped and edited into four installments for The Nation by Policymic, a new social media website. They can be viewed at http://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL7DEBB1A9162F5D15.
Max Boot's Dangerous, Deluded Vision
I refer readers to a column penned by Max Boot, fountainhead for American militarism and herald of threats largely imagined, which appeared last week in the Los Angeles Times. It is a fine specimen of alarmist cant, drawn from antique and erroneous reference points and resonant among those who conflate defense spending cuts with unilateral disarmament. Read the entire post on the US News & World Report website.
Journalism blooms in Egypt's Arab Spring
Need to Know 2011-07-06 CAIRO – Hisham Kassem, publisher, activist and mulish newspaperman has struggled most of his life to get where he is right now: in the rubble-strewn fifth floor of a high-rise building in central Cairo.
The floor plan of his new headquarters leans against the wall, but by now the contours are hard-wired in his mind: the editors will be clustered over there, below a row of unfinished windows that were blasted through an eight-inch concrete wall by pneumatic drills. To his left will be the broadcast studios and around the corner is the reporters’ section, which will be spot-lit by special halogen bulbs that, studies show, can tease peak efficiency rates from employees during the crucial 3 p.m.-6 p.m. workday interval.
For the second time in less than a decade, Kassem is publishing an independent newspaper and this time he doesn’t have to worry about thugs and spooks peering over his shoulder. He is not alone; four months after the departure of Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak after a peaceful, 18-day rebellion, the country’s state-run media is showing unprecedented spunk in its political coverage and private-sector newspapers and broadcasters are proliferating. Kassem, however, has pole position in the race to professionalize Egypt’s media; as early as two years ago, he raised a war chest to develop what may well be the one of the Arab world’s first multimedia companies that does not labor at the mercy of autocrats and other illiberal forces.
Kassem’s enterprise — for now, he is not divulging its name — is a triumph of foresight, luck or a combination of the two. After six decades of hibernation under single-party rule, Egypt’s independent news industry is emerging, blinkered and emaciated, into the light of the Arab Spring. As the region’s largest market and its former bearing point for political and cultural fashions, the tremors now rocking Egypt may transform its media industry in ways that radiate across the Arab world. “Journalism will change dramatically,” says Kassem as he shuffles through a tour of his new offices. “There will be economic pressure to close the state-owned papers, which will free up advertising which will fuel new private companies and more competition.”
That assumes, of course, that Egypt’s adolescent democracy survives into adulthood, a transition that is still far from guaranteed. It also implies that developing countries will continue to defy the downward trend in newspaper circulation that is bankrupting the industry in mature economies. Either way, the vital role tech-savvy bloggers played in the extinguishing of Mubarak’s regime suggests that the future of Egypt’s news business belongs to social media and its young masters and mistresses.
That may be the case in the long term. In the meantime, however, there is no reason why the analogue and digital eras cannot coexist profitably in the New Egypt. Though only 18 percent of the country’s 85 million people currently read daily newspapers, that share could expand with the evolution of a free press, particularly given the enormous gap between the country’s relatively small concentration of Internet users and its legions of computer illiterates. The global trend is clear: from 2000 to 2008, circulation in emerging markets grew by 35 percent, according to Tech Eye, even as it receded in industrialized nations.
“Just because people aren’t reading papers now doesn’t mean they won’t in the future,” said Cairo-based journalist Issandr El Amrani. “There’s every reason to believe that if you build a smart newspaper, readers will come.”
More than a decade ago, El Amrani worked for Kassem on his English-language Cairo Times when it was Egypt’s only independent news magazine. He remembered his old boss as an uncompromising curmudgeon who, given the arbitrary way in which the government’s draconian press laws were enforced, skillfully and effectively flirted with treason. “Hisham was a great judge of character and what he could get away with,” El Amrani said. “He knew how to get exactly to the edge of the permissible and push the boundaries, but not get the paper into unnecessary trouble.”
Years later, as publisher of the independent daily Al Masry Al Yoom, Kassem would feature blank spaces on pages where punchy stories would have appeared if not for the thin skins of powerful apparatchiks. Under his watch, Al Masry Al Yoom emerged as the most influential newspaper in Egypt as well as a rival to the state-owned Al Ahram for paying subscribers and rack sales.
In 2007, frustrated with meddlesome shareholders, Kassem decided to launch his own daily paper. He spent two years touring the world’s best news dailies and by late 2009 he had raised a capital fund worth 30 million Egyptian pounds (about $5 million) from a pool of private investors, none of whom were allowed stakes of more than 5 percent. He invested 300,000 euros in a news management system that will help him operate a relatively lean staff of 80 editors and reporters — a third of whom will be low-cost young hires with little or no experience — capable of turning around print, radio and video news coverage on a dime.
And what of the “Facebook kids,” the young bloggers who brought down a dictator with their serrated posts and staccato tweets? There will be room for them in Kassem’s new domain, but only if they check their celebrity at the door and remember their place in its old-school hierarchy. “I don’t like stars, particularly if they don’t think like journalists,” he said. “They’re a nuisance with inflated egos and they’re not as important as they say they are.”
However ambitious, Kassem is no Napoleon, let alone a Murdoch. While determined to nurture his company into a media powerhouse at home, he has no pretensions to build an empire abroad. Should post-Mubarak Egypt revive itself as the Arab world’s political and intellectual fountainhead, however, his vision for a professional news industry in Egypt will certainly have played a role. If that happens, the high production and ethical standards he has long set for himself may become one of Egypt’s most coveted exports.
As El Amrani put it: “If anyone can do it, Hisham can.”
Source URL: http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/security/journalism-blooms-in-egypts-arab-spring/10257/
The Pentagon goes to college
Progressive Magazine July 2011 Launched in April 2008, the Minerva Project funds academic research into everything from the political economy of terrorism to resource depletion. The project has its supporters as well as its vocal dissenters. Full Article - PDF
Romancing Alexandria
Web site exclusive June 2011 The fish auction begins with the close of 4 a.m. prayers, after the fleet of green-prowled fishing boats dock and unload their catch. Dozens of hawkers barter over wooden crates filled with eels, prawns, crabs, sardines, mullets, and sea bass so recent from the sea their scales glisten and their gills quiver. The stone floor is worn and gleaming from a century of use. Exposed light bulbs dangle from a cat’s cradle of electrical wire below an arched ceiling and the clerestory of a church nave.
I am in a sacred place: the fish market of Alexandria, Egypt’s oldest city and the fountainhead of some of the best seafood in the eastern Mediterranean.
“It’s a good day’s catch,” says Wagih Yusef, who weighs each buyer’s haul from the market’s cast-iron scale. “There’s been strong winds lately and that churns up the fish.”
Wagih has to bellow to make himself heard above the clamor of the bidding and his eyes never deviate from the square counterweight that hovers above the scale. He appears to be in his mid-30s and, like most of the men in the fish market, has been working here his entire life.
A few blocks north is Kadura, a café on the demand side of Alexandria’s most ancient industry. Patrons choose from the day’s catch from ice-filled cartons in a tiled stall no bigger than a walk-in closet. There is al fresco seating on sunny days, with butcher paper for tablecloth and small dishes of the house’s own chili powder. Save for the occasional clang and whir of a tram car passing along Al Ghorfa al Tiganiya Street, Kadura is a primitive but quiet refuge.
Kadura was opened in 1955 by Kadura Abdel Salem. He passed away a little over three years ago, and his sons Mohammed, 25, and Kader, are now running things. They tell the story about how one day, when their father was very young, he and their grandfather went out on a boat that wasn’t much different from the trawlers that bob in the harbor today, though without the diesel-powered engines, electronic navigation devices and power winches. There was a huge storm and the boat almost capsized and when they finally returned safely to shore, Abdel Salam was forbidden by his father from ever fishing again.
Instead, when he was 19 years old, Abdel Salem opened a café with some tables and wicker chairs he had bought for 8 piasters each. Soon, he was hosting Alexandria’s governor and his aides for lunch and during the summer the ministers came from Cairo for Kadura’s signature calamari. Within a few years he opened a restaurant that fronted the sea until the municipality reclaimed a strip of land along the coastline.
Back then, say Alexandrians old enough to remember, the fisherman would tether their boats to the windowpanes of apartment buildings.
* * *
On a recent visit to the city, I met Dr. Galal Araf, a professor of pediatrics at the University of Alexandria, while he was summering with his family at their bungalow at Montazah, a gated beach resort and a former royal compound of the Egyptian monarchy. Dr. Araf, a proud, self-contained man, was seated razor-straight in pleated gabardine trousers and a pressed short-sleeved shirt as he watched his children and grandchildren chat and frolic in the briny Mediterranean air. I asked him about the old days, the twilight time of Alexandria as a City of the World.
“Alexandria,” he told me, his eyes suddenly alight, “was filled with Greeks and Maltese, Italians and Jews. There was a quarter of the city where residents spoke only Greek. People from all over came to Alexandria to see the latest fashions from Europe. Even then, we were rivals to Paris, London, and Rome.”
It’s true that “Alex,” as she is known among her many admirers, has been showing her age. She hasn’t yet recovered from the legacy of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian president who in the 1950s nationalized the economy and drove out the Jews and the foreigners. But there is always the harbor, a crescent-shaped setting for a village founded by Alexander the Great and destined to become a pearl. It was the harbor that lured the young Macedonian here in 332 BC, and its bounty has sustained Alexandrians through a turbulent history. Most Middle Eastern cities have gone to seed over the last few generations, but few have slid from such sublimity and none with such grace. Once a flamboyant cosmopolitan with a strong Greek accent, Alex is now Muslim and staid. But even veiled, the old girl can still turn heads.
And in fact, the city is enjoying a mini-renaissance. The library has been reopened as a state-of-the-art temple of multi-media learning and on any given day is filled with student groups, including American ones. Western tourists are rediscovering Alex and some of the old villas, inns, and café’s are getting long-overdue makeovers. Hotels, including the new Four Seasons, are doing a brisk trade hosting international conferences – a testament to the city’s position as an enclave of stability in an otherwise dodgy neighborhood.
Take the Cecil Hotel, for example. Immortalized in Lawrence Durrell’s The Alexandria Quartet as the haunt of libertine expatriates and host to such giants as Somerset Maugham, Henry Moore, and Josephine Baker, the 89-room Cecil has been completely restored. The lobby is an Edwardian rapture, with high ceilings, extravagant crown molding, granite floors polished to the highest sheen, and stately chandeliers. The original elevators, with their intricately tiled parquet floors, have been rehabilitated. Le Jardin, the hotel coffee shop, is the de rigueur spot for lunching ladies and power-espresso breaks; from a window table you can enjoy a languid, if somewhat pricey, lunch in the reflection of a sparkling sea and the city’s iconic horse-drawn carriages clopping along the corniche.
From a perch like that, it’s easy to see how Alexandrians can cling to the conceit that they are more cultivated and urbane than their counterparts in noisy, congested Cairo. As Mountolive, Alexandria Quartet’s debonair but ill-fated diplomat remarks, “Alexandria is still Europe, not the Egypt of rags and sores.”
* * *
I first visited Alexandria nearly a decade ago to write about the re-opening of its famous library, the centerpiece of its restoration drive. But it was the city’s crumbling beauty that hooked me. If Alexandria was Norma Desmond, the aging screen goddess in Sunset Boulevard, I was Joe Gillis, the frustrated writer (minus, sadly, William Holden’s rakish smile and heroically cleft chin) who succumbs to her charms. It was the renowned Greek poet Constantine Cavafy, one of Alexandria’s most distinguished residents, who wrote of Alexandria as a jewel, “however much smaller it’s become.” Strolling along Alex’s corniche, you can almost hear her reply with a riff off Norma’s classic rejoinder:
I’m STILL big. It’s civilization that got small.
Things Greek – the food, the empire, Cavafy’s verses – and Alexandria’s golden age inhabit one another like old lovers. From its founding until only a few decades ago, Alexandria was a Greek city. Half its population was Greek and Greeks dominated the economy and culture. And while greatly diminished in size, those that remain are defiantly holding on. They congregate each night at the Greek Club on the community’s vast compound of neo-classical schools, community centers, gymnasium, and theatres. The buildings, radiant in faded pastels, date back to the late 19th century and the grounds are immaculately groomed with date palms, citrus trees, and hedgerows. The club itself is unexceptional – just a dozen tables and a bar tended by the Greek-Armenian Aliko, who quietly fills members’ glasses from their personal bottles of scotch that are kept at the bar. Johnny Walker Red is the preferred brand, and single-liter bottles of it, their owners’ identified by names jotted on paste-it notes, line the bar shelves like prizes at a shooting gallery. The music – Aliko also spins disks – alternates between Greek pop and old jazz standards.
It is here where I met Maroun Ayac, a Lebanese optician and restaurant owner whose family came to Alexandria from Beirut in 1898. His short-sleeve shirt is opened at the abdomen and his sunglasses are perched high on his head. He is tanned, with several days growth of grizzled beard. In Alexandria, even eye doctors look like old salts.
At 50, Maroun is young enough to remember Alexandria when it sizzled. He rattles off the names of the dozens of nightclubs, all of them now closed, that used to swing until dawn. Sunbathers on Alexandria’s beaches used to rival those of the French Riviera for daring, he says. Today, women and girls swim in their clothes for fear of offending religious conservatives.
There is nothing fin de siècle about the Greek Club, however. “We are the last of the Greek way,” Maroun says. “But we stick together and we know how to live.”
Aliko brings us olives, Greek salad, spanakotyropitakia – small pastries filled with cheese and spinach – and Armenian pastrami. He refills my glass with scotch just as Rosemary Clooney slinks into Come On-A My House.
* * *
Alexandria has been ardently romanced throughout her 1,200 years. After Alexander came Ptolemy, whose lighthouse was one of the seven wonders of the ancient world. In 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte turned Egypt into a French vassal, only to lose it to the British in an epic sea battle off the Alexandrian coast. (There is as much to see beneath the Alexandrian port as there is above it, with its trove of sunken Greek ceramics and sculpture, the ruins of the lighthouse – it was destroyed by an earthquake in the 14th century – and the remains of Bonaparte’s fleet.) Less than a decade later, an Albanian foot soldier named Muhammad Ali emerged as the Ottoman empire’s viceroy in Egypt, and under his brutal but shrewd administration the city became the entrepot of the global cotton industry. The city’s commodities exchange was one of the world’s most heavily traded.
For the next century, Alexandria reigned as the Mediterranean’s most multicultural city. Vibrant diasporas plied the cotton trade and invigorated the place with related commerce – textiles, garments, finance – to complement the city’s eternal communion with the sea. The Greeks ran the restaurants and cafés, the British the bureaucracy (naturally, as they were Egypt’s occupying power until 1945), the Swiss administered the hospitals and nursing facilities, the Armenians owned the gold shops, the Italians designed the buildings, the French ran the bakeries and patisseries, and the Maltese – as Britain’s Ghurkas of the Mediterranean – patrolled the streets.
Alexandria provided sanctuary, and sometimes exile, for royals and heads of state. Egyptian kings, first Fuad and then his son, Faruk, summered in Alexandria’s palatial villas, along with their ministers. Writers and poets like Cavafy, Durrell, and E.M. Forrester thrived off Alex’s Levantine romance and intrigue. Artists, musicians, and couturiers drew inspiration from its kaleidoscope of cultures and mores.
Ahmed Nasser was there. He is 87 and, with the help of his son Yacoub, is still owner and proprietor of Athineos, one of Alexandria’s oldest and most popular cafes. At the age of 14, he left his small village to come to Alex. “Every summer,” he told me, “living in Alexandria was like attending a wedding. The king and his cabinet ministers would come here and we’d all be working together, we Muslims, Jews, and Christians, and no one wanted to leave because of the weather and the smell of the sea.”
Then came Gamal Nasser, the Prometheus to Alexandria’s Mt. Olympus, who stole its pyre of light. It was Nasser, they say, who cast the Jews out from Egypt during the Arab-Israeli wars and then seized foreign-owned businesses. Ahmed, a Muslim, bought Athineos in 1968 from the widow of its founder Constantin Athineos after she’d finally had enough and returned to Greece.
Out of respect for Athineos’s founder, Nasser kept the name. In tribute to the past, he and Yacoub have carefully preserved the café as it was the day they bought it 41 years ago, with its grand white columns, polished granite floors, dark-wood wainscoting, and an authentic French patisserie. They’ve even opened a Greek bar in the hopes of luring back the Greeks.
That way, when the world returns for a table with a sea view, it will be as if no one ever left.
Generational tensions surface in Egypt's Brotherhood
Need to Know 2011-06-28 CAIRO – On a recent Sunday evening, at the Groppi tea room in downtown Cairo, the Muslim political activist Islam Lotfy encountered a fellow revolutionary — a proud leftist — and warmly shook his hand. The two men, both in their 20s, served in the vanguard of a nonviolent revolt that ended in February with the ousting of dictator Hosni Mubarak. It was a rebellion by, and in many ways for, Egypt’s youth, and its leaders are now struggling to define the terms of the nation’s “Second Republic.”
There was a time in Egypt when it was perfectly normal for a prominent Islamist and a left-wing secularist to meet publicly as comrades as well as rivals, particularly in the Groppi, a 100-year-old relic of Egypt’s pre-Nasserite, imperial age. Back then, liberals and conservatives, capitalists and communists, and Leninists and Trotskyites colluded and intrigued for political advantage under the authority of a progressive constitutional monarch. In his own way Lotfy, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s oldest and most powerful Islamist group, is laboring to revive the trace elements of that era as the country’s first democratic elections loom in the unruly and uncertain aftermath of Mubarak’s departure.
Last week, a cabal of young Brotherhood insurgents, with Lotfy at the helm, announced they were launching the decidedly faith-neutral Egyptian Trend Party in defiance of the movement’s old guard. A few days ahead of the announcement, I interviewed Lotfy about his party and the future of the Ikhwan, as the Brotherhood is known in Arabic, and his conclusions are shared by a growing number of informed observers here: The Ikhwan, he believes, will not survive a democratic Egypt in its current form.
“The Muslim Brotherhood is a charitable organization with moderate teachings,” Lofty told me in between a cascade of political meetings. “It is credible and honest and it is of great value. But it must evolve with the times. It needs to reach out to the people, the entire population. That is our guarantee against dictatorship.”
The day before we met, Abdel Moneim Abou el-Fotouh, a senior Brotherhood member known for his liberal views, had been expelled from the group. He had antagonized the leadership by mounting an independent campaign for president, a position it had previously forbidden its members from contesting so as not to stoke fears of an Islamist onslaught. As the head of Egypt’s medical guild, Dr. El-Fotouh was highly regarded, and his sacking — the first such dismissal within the Muslim Brotherhood in nearly 60 years — scandalized Egypt’s political classes. It also fueled speculation that the Ikhwan was fracturing under its own weight.
“We expected they would take action against El-Fotouh,” Lotfy said. “But this was by far the worst thing they could have done. They’ll probably be calling us in next and I expect I’ll be getting the same treatment.”
By “us,” Lotfy means the 200 members of the Brotherhood’s youth cadre who have joined the Egypt Trend party, which has identified itself with such temporal causes as gender equality, affordable health care and a minimum wage. In doing so, they implicitly rebuked the Ikhwan’s own Freedom and Justice party, which because of its extensive social network is expected to win a majority of seats in parliament when national elections are held in the fall — assuming, of course, it can survive the convulsions that are rocking it from within. “There now appears to be a moderate wing within the Brotherhood and there’s no guarantee it would be the only one,” Samir Soliman, a professor of political science at the American University in Cairo, told me. “The divisions are clear for all to see.”
Generational tensions within the Brotherhood had been simmering for years leading up to January 25, when activists called for a convergence on central Cairo’s Tahrir Square to rally against the brutality and corruption of the Mubarak regime. While young Ikhwanists eagerly joined the movement, manning the barricades alongside secularists and Christians to prevent security forces from dispersing the crowds, their elders carefully avoided it. Only when it was clear Mubarak was on his way out did the leadership conclusively demand his departure.
Even then, say disaffected Ikhwan members, group patriarchs discounted their role in the rebellion and dismissed their requests for greater influence over policy making. In late May, when Freedom and Justice unveiled a platform that incorporated none of their demands for more transparency, greater interaction with secular Egypt and an emphasis on civil liberties, Lotfy and his confederates decided to defect. “We held out as long as we could,” he said, “But when it was clear they were ignoring our positions, we began planning a movement of our own.”
Lotfy describes his fellow dissidents as “Arab in identity, Islamic in culture and rooted in Africa.” It will be a diverse constituency, he vowed, in spirit with Egypt’s once variegated political terrain. “We’re Muslims, but we’re pragmatic,” he said. “If I think a Marxist has some good ideas, about how to fix something, for example, I’ll listen.”
With that, Lotfy excused himself to resume his next cycle of meetings, and with it his ecumenical leap of faith.
Source URL: http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/security/generational-tensions-surface-in-egypts-brotherhood/10104/
Brothers Unburdened
As paranoics inside Washington’s Beltway agonize over the prospects of a strong showing by Islamists in Egypt’s upcoming elections, a very different reality is cohering on the streets of Cairo: the Muslim Brotherhood - historically the country’s most powerful and disciplined Islamist movement - appears to be breaking up.
The Brotherhood’s youth league has launched its own party with a progressive charter that is less about religious outreach and devotion than it is about social justice. A senior leader of the Ikhwan, as the Brotherhood is known in Arabic, who has long endorsed engagement with Egypt’s secular and non-Muslim constituencies, is running for president without the group’s official blessing. A debate within the Ikhwan about its core identity, muffled for survival’s sake under despots who suppressed free thinking of any kind, is ventilating subversively in the oxygen-rich air of the post-Mubarak era.
I was recently given an insightful tour through the Brotherhood’s molten political terrain by Mohammed Al Gebba, a young Ikhwanist who joined the group two decades ago as a high school student. A native of the coastal city of Damietta but for years an urbane Cairene, Al Gabba has evolved from ardent fundamentalist to Islamist humanist. It is a not uncommon journey in a political movement that, like its secular rivals, is scrambling to find its place in Egypt’s second republic.
“Politics and outreach are not reconcilable,” Al Gabba told me in Café Cilantro, a secularists enclave just off Tharir Square, the epicenter of the revolution that consumed the world for eighteen days ending February 11. “One compromises the other. What is needed is dialogue, and there is no dialogue in the Muslim Brotherhood.”
The Ikhwan is balkanized, according to Al Gabba, along ideological as well as demographic lines. Though he sympathizes with its youthful renegades, he chose to remain in the Brotherhood as a cadre to its relatively liberal wing despite the leadership’s rightward lurch in elections last year. It is the former, rather than the latter, he says, that is most faithful to the vision of Hasan Al Banna, the revivalist imam who founded the Ikhwan in 1926. “Our principals were his principals,” he said. “They are values of tolerance and dialogue.”
Al Gabba was deeply involved in the clashes between the confederation of secularists and Islamists, Christians and Muslims, and Communists and Capitalists against repeated onslaughts by regime loyalists to clear Tharir square. Having outlasted Mubarak and his hangers on, the revolution is now under threat by the proxies of foreign powers - not Israel and America, the usual suspects trotted out by demagogues of the ancién regime - but Iran and Saudi Arabia, tactical allies against the Arab world’s liberal awakening. “This is the one thing they can agree on,” says Al Gabba. “Their objective is to create chaos, to provoke the Egyptian army into oppression, to destroy the revolution.”
Conspiracy theories are as intrinsic to Egyptian politics as parsley is to Tabouleh, if for no other reason that so many of them have turned out to be more truth that fantasy. As proof of Saudi-Iranian perfidy, Al Gabba cites a seminar, to be held on July 1, on the salience and inevitability of sharia law in Egypt. A prominent Salafi sheik, he says, has declared the event to be the inspiration of Saudi Wahhabists working in tandem with remnants of Mubarak’s security apparatus.
If such intrigues do exist, according to Al Gabba, they will backfire. After nearly six decades of authoritarian rule, he told me, Egyptians will settle for nothing less than a secular republic. Candidates fielded by the Muslim Brotherhood in the coming election may do well, he allowed, but they are unlikely to capture more than a quarter of parliamentary seats. He predicts that in the next national ballot five years from now, Ikhwan members will campaign as independents whose loyalty to the state and devotion to faith are secularly distinct from each other.
Otherwise, he said, “the Brotherhood will bring itself down. It will ease to exist as we know it.”
Gallery
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US Spending on Arms Is Senseless
The National 2008-04-15 15:24:10Comity in this most bitter of American presidential campaigns is as routine as interplanetary alignment. But there is at least one thing all three candidates agree upon: the US is not spending enough money on national defence. Welcome to Planet Washington. Both Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, the Democrat candidates, and John McCain, the Republican contender, have pledged to spend more on the US military than the Pentagon’s current $518 billion (Dh1.9 trillion) annual funding request, which is equal to four per cent of gross domestic product. If you toss in related, off-budget expenditures – most notably for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are funded separately as emergency appropriations – the figure could be as much as twice that amount. The US now accounts for more than half the world’s outlays on national security. The combined defence spending of China, Russia, Cuba, Iran and North Korea, the usual suspects trotted out by Pentagon officials on the rare occasions they are asked to justify their budget requests, is estimated at $206bn. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there has been no serious opposition to the wanton subsidy of a Cold War-era US arsenal that is all but irrelevant to the country’s asymmetrical security threats. With a recession looming and the all-in bill for America’s two wars estimated at $1tn to $3tn, voters have had little to say about record-high defence bills beyond a bromidic vow to “support the troops”, as if the welfare of American soldiers and Marines were an end in itself rather than a means to protect US interests at home and abroad. Lawmakers, assiduously courted by the Pentagon and defence contractors by locating factory lines for new weaponry in their districts, are equally passive in the face of the largest military budget since the Second World War in inflation-adjusted dollars. A riff through the Pentagon’s $100bn procurement budget is like sitting in on the war counsels of the Truman years. At a time when the US faces no conventional threat, a thoughtful electorate and responsible legislators might ask the following questions: Why does the US need two next-generation fighter-bomber programmes, the $200bn F-35 and the $70bn F-22, the latter of which was designed in the early 1980s to dogfight Soviet jets that were never developed? Does the US Navy need to spend $65bn to upgrade and expand its fleet of attack submarines, Cold War relics that were tasked to trail Soviet ballistic missile subs, a mission that no longer exists? Of what use is the proposed $15bn DDX destroyer, rife as it is with cost overruns and delays, against terrorist cells? Does the deployment of some 370,000 troops overseas really make America safer? Was it not US bases in Saudi Arabia (and Washington’s unequivocal support of Israel) that provoked Osama bin Laden’s attacks on American soil in the first place? What exactly are 100,000 troops doing in Europe – waiting for the Warsaw Pact to reactivate itself? Ditto the 70,000 soldiers and GI’s in Japan and South Korea, two of the world’s richest economies with the capacity to provide their own deterrence against real and potential threats. It has been nearly two decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Chinese economy, although robust, is generations away from being a credible threat to US dominance of air and sea. (Only a lunatic would consider waging a land war in Asia.) The American people should demand a defence budget appropriate to the threats arrayed against them. As it stands, what they’re getting now is a welfare state for the manufacture of outdated weaponry and a jobs mill for their fungible representatives in Congress.
Today A Villain of Wall Street, Tomorrow A Hero
Has Wall Street changed? Will legislators in Washington impose modesty and restraint on an industry notorious for possessing neither? Can they banish greed from a system that just more than a year ago brought the global financial system to the brink of collapse?Certainly the nation’s top investment banks, at least those that remain, have shifted down to suit the risk-aversion trend. No longer are traders loading up on synthetic derivatives and cluttering their balance sheets with unknowable levels of debt. With the help of record-low interest rates, investment-grade corporations are deleveraging by raising cash to pay off bank loans. Just in time for the holidays, corporate heads are engaging in their own secular acts of contrition. Over the past three weeks, Goldman Sachs and General Electric have expressed regret for feeding a speculative pyre that became an inferno. There is a sense among the more thoughtful of Wall Street princelings that it is better to work with Congress than to oppose it openly. On any given day, the Acela Express, the elite rail service that links Washington and New York, is filled with corporate executives eager to make their case against the kind of reform some liberal legislators are demanding. But beyond that there is an implied culture of invulnerability on Wall Street, a knowing sense that populist politicians, like military generals busily planning for the last war, are looking backward while financiers incubate The Next Big Thing that will reshape the world. Washington is reactive, say corporate execs. It responds to a financial crisis with a new set of purpose-built regulations, despite the fact that asset bubbles are as distinct from one another as snowflakes. In contrast, the Street – which has, by the way, migrated from its original home in Manhattan’s gritty downtown section to glamorous midtown, alongside the top-flight boutiques and cafes of Rockefeller Centre – is innovative, bold and visionary. Like the scientists who split the atom, traders are not about to give up on their more exotic confections just because they are capable of great destruction. After all, junk bonds were once rogue products and became respectable in time. Besides, say the finance lords, market meltdowns are incidental to the Street’s capacity for community enrichment. A generation ago, the interest rate on a US$100 million (Dh367.2m) bond issue to build, say, a municipal water and sewage system was a whopping 3.5 per cent. Today, thanks to financial innovations such as interest rates swaps, which allow issuers to lock in spreads at a fixed rate, the interest on such a transaction would be a mere $500,000 or so. And now Congress, in its primitivism, would introduce “reforms” that would deprive local government of such efficiency. Or take year-end bonuses, which last year averaged $13.8m among the top 100 executives in the US. Excessive? Not so much, the Street reminds us, when you consider that the chief executive of a top investment bank routinely works 18 hours a day, every day, to keep his institution afloat in an age where huge trades, conducted in micro-seconds, can turn entire markets upside down. The average longevity of a Morgan Stanley partner, it turns out, is only four years and 10 months. With an attrition rate like that, why should a managing director strategise for the long term when his knees are likely to give out in just a few years? Why not grasp for the big carrot on a short stick and squeeze what you can out of every trade and underwriting deal? And the controversy over ratings agencies? Certainly – begins a rare Street mea culpa, followed by a world-weary appeal to reason – there are conflicts of interest when firms like Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s are remunerated by the very companies they are appraising. But by all accounts, the process is transparent. Prospective investors have only to search the internet to learn the agencies’ methodology. Besides, what is the alternative? Congressional oversight, as has been suggested in Washington? Intervention by the very deliberative body that is incapable of funding itself without generous assistance from the People’s Republic of China? Are politicians prepared to assign investment grades to companies and then take responsibility when those decisions prove to be ill-advised, even disastrous? What distinguishes Wall Street from Washington is not virtue, an attribute sorely lacking in both power centres, but candour. In the 1980s, investment bankers referred to themselves as the Masters of the Universe. In fact, they are more like the mythological gods of ancient Greece, all-powerful and yet blemished by the human characteristics of avarice and arrogance. Like Zeus and Aphrodite, the Goldmans and GEs seduce mortals, and they occasionally pay a price for their conceit. Just as the Greeks saw in the gods they created their own qualities, both inspirational and loathsome, the deities of Wall Street represent an ideal we embrace in prosperity only to demonise in penury. [gallery]However fashionable it is to bash the lords of finance, they know that when the cycle finally turns, they will once again be celebrated as heroes. They also understand that this is one claim their counterparts in Washington, gridlocked as they are by petty parochialism and stratospheric indebtedness, can never make.
US Desperately Needs A Viable Industrial Policy
A little more than a decade ago, South Koreans who wanted to buy a home appliance had few options other than patronising the boutique stores owned by the country's top three electronics makers. There was little in the way of competition; the relatively high prices were more or less fixed and the quality was uniformly poor.Imported wares were rendered unaffordable to all but the wealthy by high duties, or locked out of the market altogether by non-tariff barriers. Alternatively, there was the black market, but only for those with contacts inside the huge US military base in downtown Seoul.It was hardly a consumer-friendly culture, which is just what the government wanted. The fewer the items to buy, the greater the incentive to save and the larger the pool of capital available for the nation's large conglomerates, the foundries of a great export machine. The Samsungs and the Hyundais concentrated on foreign markets, not domestic ones, and they invested their revenue into more factories and raw materials for the production of more exports. That, in a nutshell, was the corpus of South Korea's industrial policy. It was transparently mercantilist and patriarchal, enabled by the traditional East Asian respect for authority. For a time, the so-called Asian model for growth worked beautifully - for Korea, as well as Japan before it, just as it is working well for China today.The US had an industrial policy in the wholesale rejection of industrial policies. Instead, it embraced something called the Washington Consensus, a liberal orthodoxy of free trade and lightly regulated markets that organically winnowed away inefficient enterprises. Whereas the Asian economy was planned, the US economy evolved naturally in faith with the cultural conceit of rugged individualism and contempt for federal control. It, too, worked for a time. The Great Credit Collapse of 2008 and the Asian Currency Implosion of 1997-1998 exposed the critical - and as it turns out, antipodal - flaws in both systems. While Asia emphasised industrial might at the expense of financial flexibility, the US did just the opposite. Asia's reservoir of liquidity is still under-served by primitive credit markets and its monetary authority is inhibited by a Pavlovian impulse to rig currencies. The US, meanwhile, is paying a stiff price for its high-finance fetish. Having allowed services, property speculation and exotic investment vehicles to replace manufacturing as the driver of growth, or at least the illusion of it, Americans are more adept at online shopping than they are at building things. True, the US remains one of the world's top manufacturers, but the trend is clear. The "supply side" revolution - the Reagan-era line that lasting prosperity could be purchased with a strong dollar, tax cuts and financial deregulation - shooed factories abroad and made debt finance the coin of the American realm. The value of US debt - public, corporate and household - amounts to 350 per cent of GDP, a burden disturbingly similar to the one that Japan confronted after the 1990 collapse of its real estate bubble, which was followed by a generation of flat growth. "Our model for what's happening in the US is Japan," says Fareed Mohamedi, the chief economist for PFC Energy. "This is a 10-year debt workout." Is it time for a US industrial policy? Some economists and politicians, including the US President Barack Obama, think so. Entrepreneurs make a strong case for government help in developing germinal green technology. Beyond that, however, there is little known precedent for the re-industrialisation of a post-modern economy. Short of fixing wages, subsidising raw materials and erecting import barriers - which would be illegal under international trade law - it is difficult to see how the US could replenish a desiccating industrial landscape. What Washington could do - for the good of society as well as the economy - is guarantee high-quality, affordable health care, education and public transport for all its citizens. Should that swell an already overstretched public dole, so be it. America's free-market pretensions notwithstanding, the US economy is lousy with subsidies, be they defence budget handouts to arms makers, bailouts for car makers or credits for farm combines. Employee-based health insurance has proved itself to be an abysmal failure, so much so that the once mighty General Motors is characterised as a "health-care company that makes cars". American secondary schools are in crisis and US students are rapidly falling behind other nations in mathematics and the sciences. Transportation grids are in disrepair and grossly favour the very hydrocarbon fuels from which the rest of the developed world - and China for that matter - is trying to wean itself. It may be too late for the US to resurrect itself as a labour-intensive industrial powerhouse, but it may also be that a healthier, better educated and more mobile workforce is all the industrial policy it needs.
MidEast AmBush: How Bush policies undermine U.S., and region's, interests.
The National Interest - online edition 2006-09-05 So much attention has been paid to the Bush Administration's dramatic confrontations with its enemies in the Middle East that there is little consideration of how it treats its Arab allies there. In its rush to dispose of perceived threats to U.S. interests in the region, the White House has neglected its relations with Jordan and Saudi Arabia, while accommodating an increasingly autocratic Egypt. And the White House, not to mention the "expert" commentary on the Middle East, fails to distinguish differences between Arab governments and groups-and the U.S. interests at stake with each.
Washington has empowered Islamist groups, particularly the local chapters of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, that are bolstering their political and theological franchise by fanning fears of a U.S. war on Islam. The nature of U.S. hegemony, embodied in the ever-tightening relationship with Israel, has made it impossible for moderate Arab regimes to cooperate with Washington-contributing to the leadership vacuum that was so achingly apparent during the month-long conflict between Israel and Lebanon's Hizballah. And while the White House neglects the House of Saud, it overindulges Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and overestimates the staying power of the Mubarak dynasty.
The Egyptian leader is unwittingly plotting his regime's demise by refusing to recognize rising and potentially destabilizing discontent and to neutralize it through an open political process. Mubarak's re-election last September in Egypt's first free-albeit hardly fair, according to a legion of impartial monitors-national ballot raised hopes that the Bush Administration would pressure Cairo to allow opposition groups to mobilize as political parties. Such a move would have not only put into tangible effect Bush's signature rhetoric on democracy, it would also have created for Mubarak an escape valve for tensions.
Then, in May, when violent demonstrations erupted amid high-level charges of official vote rigging and voter intimidation, many reformers believed Mubarak, with American prodding, would finally relent. Instead, he locked up protestors and rejected a legal appeal from dissident Ayman Nour, who in January 2005 was convicted and jailed on spurious forgery charges. U.S. diplomats in Cairo were stunned by the move, since they had been assured by senior authorities that Nour, a diabetic in poor health, would be released.
Not only did Washington fail to check Mubarak's excesses, it hosted his son and rumored heir apparent, Gamal, at a "secret" meeting in the White House. On the streets of Cairo, the timing of the encounter-it took place just as the demonstrations were gaining momentum-was taken as a White House endorsement of not only Mubarak's tactics but also his filial succession. Indeed, Egyptians see President Bush's pledge to spread democracy throughout the Middle East as fraudulent as the election that returned the 78-year-old Mubarak to his fifth and most certainly final term.
The United States gets little in return for subsidizing Mubarak's brutality. True, Egypt has provided tactical assistance-"rendering" suspected terrorists for interrogation, for example, or negotiating the release of journalists held hostage in Gaza. But Mubarak has studiously avoided playing a constructive role on the issues of overriding, strategic importance to the United States: ending Israeli-Palestinian violence and helping to pre-empt a conflagration over Iranian nuclear ambitions. As the leader of what is widely regarded as the most influential Arab state, Mubarak has chosen to insulate himself amid Arab-world equivocation. Are these the results that Bush, the most unilateral of U.S. leaders, hoped to achieve? Either way, the Middle East is poorer for it.
And what happens at the end of Mubarak's term? Though widely tipped as his successor, Gamal has earned no power base of his own and will most likely flee Egypt should his father die suddenly or become incapacitated. Odds are better that Mubarak will transfer power to a military man in exchange for his own and his family's protection, to spare them the fate that Anwar Sadat meted out to Gamal Abdel Nasser's inner circle after the latter's death in 1970.
Or, Mubarak could be succeeded in free and fair elections by Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, widely considered the most capable political organization in the Arab world today, with an unparalleled network of patronage and community services. Absent secular competition, the Brotherhood (which is banned as a party but fields candidates as independents) has enlarged its bloc in Parliament to 88 seats, making it the largest opposition group in Egypt. A Brotherhood victory in Egypt would shake an already tremulous Middle East. It would complete the transition of political Islam from the fringes of power to its epicenter, with unknown consequences. And absent some tough love from Cairo's "friends" in the White House, it just might happen.
Conversely, Jordan's King Abdullah II has little to show for his close ties to a U.S. government regarded by most of his subjects with contempt because of its unconditional support for Israel dating back to the outbreak of the second Palestinian Intifada in September 2000.
Jordanians, who now includes tens of thousands of Iraqi refugees as well as long-disaffected ethnic Palestinians, are already impatient with a government considered increasingly corrupt, ineffective, and out of touch with its needs. The Islamic Action Front, which has close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo, is expected to do well in municipal and Parliamentary elections due later this year and in early 2007. Should the IAF capture a significant bloc of legislative seats, the Bush Administration will be faced with the by-now familiar Hobbesian choice of either accepting an Islamist group's electoral success in a key Arab state that does not recognize Israel, or repudiating it. If history is any guide, the Bush Administration will miscalculate, choosing the latter option at Abdullah's expense.
Saudi Arabia is also estranged from a deeply unpopular Bush Administration after decades of close cooperation with America. Well before he was made king last August, Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud and foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, moved to diversify Riyadh's diplomatic portfolio away from an increasingly pro-Israel Washington by opening the Saudi energy market and other sectors of its economy to foreign investment. Today, the kingdom is enjoying an economic boom and has strong ties with countries such as France and China, which are often in opposition to U.S. foreign policy.
The U.S. embassy in Riyadh, meanwhile, is a near-empty shell. Following terrorist bombings on foreign residential compounds in Riyadh more than two years ago, the State Department recalled all but its most essential personnel from Saudi Arabia and many U.S. businesses in the kingdom, including Citibank, closed their doors. Among the foreign companies enriching themselves off of Saudi Arabia's $300-billion windfall in oil revenue due to record-high crude prices, American corporations and investors are miserably under-represented.
At the same time, the number of Saudi visitors to the United States, either as students, businessmen, or tourists, has plummeted due to post-9/11 visa restrictions. Many of those that do visit the United States complain of harassment from U.S. immigration officials.
The degradation of U.S.-Saudi ties is all the more regrettable in light of the many ways that Abdullah has distinguished himself as a natural ally of the Bush Administration's struggle to manage the Mid-East chaos-uncorked to a large degree by the White House itself. Since the May 2004 bombings, the king's vigorous counter-terrorist campaign against Islamic militants has been effective. He has revealed himself to be an assertive (by Saudi standards) proponent of political and economic reform. And he is regarded as a statesman for the land-for-peace deal he presented at the March 2002 Arab League summit in Beirut, which was all but ignored by the United States and Israel.
The Bush Administration cannot neutralize its adversaries in the Middle East without first giving its friends there an incentive to assist it. That means quietly persuading hardliners like Mubarak that gradual but quantifiable political reform is of existential (political and possibly physical) importance. It also demands the revival of Washington's role as an honest mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which despite White House denials remains at the core of Middle East instability. Salving that wound would help to restore America's image on the Arab street and enable its traditional allies to once again embrace U.S. leadership in the region. And it would undermine Islamist groups, which nourish themselves on popular anxieties over U.S. hegemony in the heart of the Muslim world.
The Xi and Li Show Amidst uncertainty on the horizon, China prepares for a change of leadership
Al Majalla04-26- 2011
Two years ago, on a visit to Mexico, a senior Chinese official responded gruffly to what he regarded as a hectoring American hegemony. In a not-so-veiled swipe at US policymakers, Xi Jinping slammed “foreigners who have stuffed their bellies and don’t have anything to do but point fingers...We aren’t making trouble for you. What else is there to say?” It was an indelicate, petulant reproach that even some Chinese bloggers suggested was beneath someone who was penciled in to become Beijing’s supreme leader.
In October, the by-then Vice President Xi was appointed Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, a key post that all but cemented the likelihood of him succeeding President Hu Jin-tao at next year’s Party Congress. He is expected to be accompanied in his elevation by Li Keqiang, who is groomed to succeed Jin Jiabao as premier. If all goes as planned, the two men will assume control of the country as it faces what may well be the most complex age in its modern history. China’s red-hot economy may collapse, relations between Beijing and Washington, though recovered slightly from a year or so of angry squabbling, are bound to be tested again most likely over such issues as China’s currency manipulation and its claims on Southeast Asian sea lanes. Yearnings for political reform, expressed only faintly today, may find a louder voice later on.
To make things even more uncertain, the magnitude of the challenges China will certainly face is directly disproportionate to the experience of the men, beginning with Xi and Li, who will confront them. Long gone are the disciples of Deng Xiaoping, the sage helmsman who steered China from madness to modernity in the 1990s. In the bland normalcy that has become China’s ruling culture, say Asian experts, there are precious few personalities of strength and daring who appear equal to the tasks ahead. Nor does there seem to be much in the way of a rapport between Xi and Li, who come from vastly different backgrounds. While Xi, a product of China’s revolutionary elites, is a believer in free-market orthodoxy, Li, who rose from obscurity to lead an important cadre of his own, is thought to be wary of capitalism’s destructive properties and sympathetic to its casualties. Despite China’s scripted political theatre, tension between the two men and the factions they lead is all but inevitable.
“It’s hard to find a Deng Xiaoping in this crowd,” says Charles Freeman, a China scholar at Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies. “China is looking at an unprecedented array of domestic and international challenges, and here are people entering leadership positions with little experience. This has huge implications.”
It was Deng himself who laid down the rules according to which all party leaders must retire after they turn 68. These leadership transfers have been all but smooth. Indeed, should the 2012 Party Congress conclude without a civil war or national upheaval, it would mark only the second time in the history of Communist China that power was transferred peacefully.
Under Hu, who stressed compromise for the sake of party cohesion, Chinese politics have become consensus-driven as well as adversarial. Chinese commentators have likened his ruling circle to a “team of rivals,” a reference to US President Abraham Lincoln’s ambitious and sometimes fractious cabinet. It is defined by two ideological factions: the Communist Youth League, or tuanpai, and the Shanghai Gang. The former group, led by Hu and Wen, favors broadly balanced economic growth engineered by a strong central government on behalf of what used to be called the workers’ proletariat. For members of the tuanpai, high inflation and corruption are the enemies of stability because they directly impact the masses. Li, a Hu protégé, is very much identified with this group.
The Shanghai Gang—politicians mentored by Jiang Zemin, who preceded Hu as president—believe the best way to generate jobs and growth is to devolve power from the state to the provincial level, even if that means tolerating some levels of instability and corruption. It was under Jiang’s administration in the 1990s that China experienced some of its most vertiginous rates of growth alongside equal doses of graft. Xi is associated with the Shanghai Gang—Hank Paulson, the former US treasury secretary, has praised Xi for his adherence to free-market ideals—but not so closely so as to preclude him as Hu’s heir apparent. Indeed, Xi owes his success largely to his ability to avoid antagonizing rivals while cultivating allies.
Xi—a so-called “princeling,” as the offspring of China’s revolutionary generation are known—is best known as the son of one cultural icon and the husband of another. His father, Xi Zhongxun, was a founder of the guerrilla movement in northern China and a Long March veteran who was purged twice, once in the 1940s and again two decades later, before he was rehabilitated under Deng. During the Cultural Revolution, Xi worked the land in rural Shaanxi—most urban youth at the time were obliged to show solidarity with the worker classes—and local farmers were so impressed with his rigor they named him village party chief. He received a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry at Tsinghua University and remained there to earn a PhD in law.
In 2000, Xi was made governor of Fujian province, where he presided over an economy flourishing with investment from neighboring Taiwan. Two years later, he was assigned the same job in the commercial powerhouse of Zhejiang province. He served as party boss there for five years, and residents speak fondly of him. They are amused that the buttoned-down Xi could be married to Peng Liyuan, a popular folk singer and head of the People’s Liberation Army’s song and dance troupe, but no one can remember a speech he gave or attributed to him a particular policy. Even Communist Party members are hard-pressed to come up with a signature Xi achievement. “Xi has nothing to do with the economy here,” says a municipal official in Wenzhou, Zhejiang’s thriving port city. “But his father was a famous revolutionary and that helped make him a star.”
Like the dark horse Xi, Li Keqiang spent time in the countryside during the Cultural Revolution and later studied law. Their shared experiences end there, however. Chinese databases seem to have been digitally air brushed of any mention of Li’s family, including his father’s name and occupation. As for Li himself, interviews with colleagues and contemporaries describe him as a passionate student who taught himself English by reciting phrases from a notebook. “He kept reading aloud even as he was on his way to the library or queuing in the cafeteria for food,” says He Qinhua, Li’s former classmate at Beijing University. Huang Nanping, an academic who as an undergraduate at Beijing University roomed down the hall from Li, remembers him as a committed, if sober-minded student activist. “He was a good student,” says Huang, “very active and free-thinking.” While at law school, he translated a US textbook on constitutional law into Chinese and later co-wrote a book on economic reforms.
After graduation, Li joined the Communist Youth League, a farm club for promising party members. He became a lieutenant to Hu, the league’s then chairman, who ran the organization as a political machine and source of patronage that serves him to this day. With Hu’s help, Li was given the top party job in Hunan province, where he survived a series of man-made disasters, including an AIDS epidemic and a deadly explosion at a government-run mine. In 2004, he was transferred to the heavily industrialized province of Liaoning, which is saddled with a concentration of large state-owned companies that were sold off more than a decade ago as part of a massive and hugely corrupt privatization drive. Divestment had created an army of jobless and often restive blue-collar workers.
Li was tasked with cleaning up the mess. Among his first acts as party boss was to expand a resettlement program for pink-slipped government employees with funds raised from both public and private sources. “Chinese people are easy to please,” says Wang Zhaohui, a political scientist at Beijing University. “If they see someone reaching out to help, they respond in kind. They know who’s good for them. Li showed them compassion.”
For all their different backgrounds and sensibilities, it could be that Xi and Li will end up complementing each another, with Xi appealing to free market apostles at home and abroad and Li expressing China’s traditional empathy with the developing world while driving a wedge through the industrialized one. Touring Europe in January, Li reassured his diplomatic counterparts that Beijing would dutifully invest in the continent’s sovereign debt, signaling ever so subtly that its appetite for US treasuries had its limits while distracting a stricken eurozone from a US-led campaign to pressure China into devaluing its currency. (Li even found time to pen an opinion column headlined “The world should not fear a growing China,” for the Financial Times.)
Pitting foreigners against each other may prove to be the easiest of tasks for China’s new leadership. Since opening to the West, China has been spared the kind of existential threats that have frequently driven it into disarray. Relations with its neighbors are peaceful, if at times uneasy, and its economy has defied warnings of a denouement. Sooner or later, however, gravity will impose itself on the mightiest economic expansion in history and China will face a genuine crisis. The people will seek reassurance from a leader—an animated, corporeal, credible personality—rather than a committee of bland apparatchiks. If the leader fails, the team of rivals becomes a thicket of punji sticks. A vacuum is created and tumult ensues, beckoning a challenge from an insurrectionist cadre or perhaps even the military.
Managing the world’s most populous nation and dynamic economy was tough enough for hard-boiled men like Deng and his contemporaries, let alone for greenhorns like Xi and Li, and the job will only get more complex as it matures. Economically, China will become more vulnerable to viral shocks as its financial systems integrate and digitize while demands for political reform to suit the needs of a more agile, consumer-driven economy will amplify. Its relentless hunger for raw materials makes some kind of confrontation with the US likely, given Washington insistence on control of “the global commons,” Pentagon-speak for every strategic land bridge, waterway and air corridor on Earth. Mindful of the challenges ahead, Xi and Li would do well to consider the adage of another American statesman, Benjamin Franklin, who once urged his fellow revolutionaries to “hang together, lest we all hang separately.”